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Lauren Brubaker

should have sufficient respect for Smith the philosopher to assume that

he isn't blind to his own critique of men of system (TMS VI.ii.2.7-18).

We should thus pay close attention to his explicit indications of the natural
limits of his own 'obvious and simple system'.
Smith was acutely aware of the problems facing the establishment of
impartial justice and religious and economic liberty. This awareness makes
it all the more necessary to explain and defend the advantages and to
protect the achievements of these where they exist. Otteson and Smith are
on the same side here, and that is the side of moderate liberalism. Smith
is neither a traditionalist nor a libertarian. Liberalism is not well served
by downplaying the difficulty of its realization by an overemphasis on
unintended beneficial consequences. Once established. however, the advan
tage of a traditional prejudice in its favor is not to be lightly dismissed.

Adam Smith
Why decentralized systems?
Maria Pia

Paganelli

'I have never known much good done by those who affected to trade for
the public good'
(WN IV.ii.9)

James Otteson's book (2002) is a comprehensive and clear analysis of
Smith's two worlcs
Wealth of Nations and The Theory of Moral
Sentiments
and their relation. Otteson's detailed analysis shows how,
for Smith, market systems and moral systems are similar. Both are gener
ated by individual decisions. And both generate unintended systemic social
order. I think Otteson's analysis is correct. In this paper I develop one
possible implication of Otteson's reading of Smith (that Otteson did not
develop) aimed at justifying his Smith's position (as read by Otteson).
Smith describes human beings as imperfect and not perfectible. Given all
their biases, delusions and mistakes, bow can individuals live together, be
virtuous, and prosper? In both TMS and WN, Smith answers that individ
uals do not know what is best for them and/or for �iety, but with a decen
tralized process of trial and error they develop successful rules of behaviour
and/or institutions that allow them to achieve their goals as well as, unin
tentionally, social order. The question this paper asks is: was Smith accurate
in describing how, aiming at something other than social order, individual
decisions unintentionally and spontaneously generate social order?
The answer I offer is yes. Smith's implicit model of social order works
because it focuses on how to minimize the consequences of mistakes and
imperfections in society rather than on how to create the best social system.
-

-

I Why decentraUzed systems are preferred to
centralized systems in theory and in practice
decentralized system is a system in which there are many autonomous
and independent decision centres, as many as the number of individuals
(or groups of individuals) present in the system. Individual decision centres
choose accordingly to individual costs and benefits. The well-being of the
system may not be taken into account individually, and the decision centres

A
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may not be coordinated. A centralized system is a system in which there
is one (or few) decision centre(s), the decisions of which are for the entjre
system.
Borrowing the concept from robust statistics (Mosteller and Tukey 1977),
a robust system is a system that minimizes catastrophic results under non
ideal conditions, even if it may not be the most efficient system under
ideal conditions. It asks the questions: what is the worst that can happen?
How is it avoidable? A fragile system is a system that collapses under
non-ideal conditions, even if it may be the most efficient system under
ideal conditions. It asks: what is the best that can happen? How is it
achievable?
Decentralized systems tend to be robust. Decentralized systems mini
mize catastrophic results if there is a mistake, because of their very
decentralized nature. Decisions are taken at the individual level, and their
consequences remain at the local level. If a decision is incorrect and causes
disasters, only the individual decision maker (or maybe his close surround
ings) may face the catastrophe, but the rest of the system may remain
unaffected.
Centralized systems tend to be fragile. With centralized decisions, conse
quences are global by definition. If an error is made with a centralized
decision, the entire system is affected and likely to face disasters.
Centralized systems that aim at achieving the best possible outcome expose
themselves to catastrophic outcomes in case of mistakes.
Smith claims that decisions taken at the individual level - a decentral
ized system - generate social order both in the economic spherel and in the
moral sphere. To Understand why Smith described a decentralized system
as able to generate social order, let us ask ourselves: what is the alterna
tive? The alternative to a decentralized system as described by Smith is a
centralized system. Smith does not design the best social order ever, but he
describes a social order that is able to cope with human imperfections. The
decentralized spontaneous orders he describes are robust systems.
Let us apply the two frameworks to analyze social systems.4
Assume angelic selfless, unbiased, and rational men - perfect human
beings or at least perfectible. This assumption can be used on two levels.
Either all individuals are selfless, Wlbiased, and rational, or a group of them
is. If only a group of individuals is selfless, unbiased, and perfectly rational,
or at least more so than the rest of the population, this group should be in
charge of leading the rest to perfection. Perfect social harmony is achiev
able, even if with some effort, under the (central) direction of the privi
leged group. This is the description (and prescription) of a centralized
system. Centralized decisions made by the best individuals to better the
conditions of others generate the highest performance for the entire social
system, as in model A of Figw-e 5. On the other hand, if the best group is
not in charge of the rest of society because of the existence of a decen
tralized system (model B), society is not as wen off (B1<A1). But what if

(

I
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all men are self-interested and self-centred? What if nobody is either perfect
or perfectible? Using a centralized system under non-ideal conditions
causes disasters (A�. A decentralized system does not (B.J. Similarly, if
all individuals are basically perfect, there is no need for leadership, as
all, being perfect, know what is best to do. Perfect social harmony is
achieved effortlessly. But what would happen to a social order designed
for perfect individuals, if the individuals turn out to be imperfect and not
perfectible?
Authority . . . would nowhere be so dangerous as in the hands of a man
who had folly and presumption enough to fancy himself/it to exercise it.
'

(WN IV.ii.lO)
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Now, assume (or observe) imperfect and not perfectible men, cursed
with defects, vices, greed, biases, and delusions. A decentralized system
(model B) perfonns well. The consequences of individual (inevitable)
mistakes are minimized because they are localized, and a stable social
order is possible.
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Given the imperfectio n of human nature, a decentralized system is like
lier to generate a social order suitable to the human condition. Given the
imperfection of hwnan nature, a centralized system, even if beautiful, is
likelier to cause disasters because the consequences of decisions are global.
In this sense, we can say with Smith, that a decentralized system of self
interested individuals (a system of natural liberty) is able to generate a
spontaneous, unintended, and good social order, by localizing the poten
tially catastrophic consequences of human imperfections and frequent
mistakes.

ll Smith is right
Smith describes how a decentralized system allows for a social order that
is able to cope with all sort of human imperfections: (1) at the individual
level and (2) at the group level.
The analysis of the individual can have at least three starting points:
(a) all individuals are perfect; (b) some indii
v duals are better than others
and can lead the others to better their conditions; (c) all individuals are
imperfect and not perfectible. Smith descnbe
' s all men as imperfect and
not perfectible. Given his starting point, a decentralized system is the
description of a system that works, at least better than a centralized one.
Smith rejects the idea of human perfection. TMS is an account of human
imperfection and systematic mistakes. Man is limited by his physical con
ditions (TMS I.i.1.2). The use of imagination to relate to the rest of the
world causes gross mistakes, all the time. We identify with the hero of a
novel, even if it is not true. We feel sorry for the dead because they are
cold and lonely when they are just dead (TMS I.i.l.13). The poor man's
son believes that riches will make him happy, struggles all his life to achieve
them, eventually to find out it is not true (TMS IV.l.8). Our impartial spec
tator, who is supposed to lead us on the right way, is in reality partial and
self-centred. The achievement of impartiality is basically not possible in
human life. We are constantly deluded (TMS III). We are driven by pas
sions, and only after the fact we rationalize our actions so that we can
either live with ourselves or feel good about it (in particular TMS ill.4 and
also WN V.i.f.26). We are envious, weak, vain, egotistic, narcissistic, and
we struggle all our life to be someone we naturally are not so that others
can praise us (TMS II1.3.4).
Despite all this, societies do not often fall apart. There are at least two
reasons for this, both related to polycentrism. An individual copes with his
biases by multiplying the decision centres around him. If there is one deci·
sion centre (an individual in isolation), biases are overwhelming and
deforming. But in a social context, when the centres are multiplied, multi
ple perspectives are available to dilute errors (TMS Ill.3.38-43). Similarly,
a successful society copes with human biases and imperfections by having
as many decision centres as possible, therefore trying not to impose
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individual mistakes on others (for example WN V.i.g.7-9). On the other
hand, when individuals are far from perfect, having a (beautiful) social
order for perfect individuals will likely have catastrophic results (TMS
VI. ii.2.17-18).
Smith also rejects the idea that some individuals are somehow better
than others and therefore should be in charge of the others.6 Political
leaders, philosophers, and teachers are just as limited, imperfect, and mis
taken as everybody else. There are no reasons for them to try to generate
a social order better than (or to correct) the one spontaneously emerging
from a decentralized system. Actually, there are reasons for preventing
them from trying. Political leaders are corrupt and easily corruptible. They
give in to the flattery of those who surround them and allow the creation
of socially dysfunctional monopolies. So:
[t]he statesman who should attempt to
direct private people .. . would
assume an authority which could safely be trusted
, not only to no
single person, but to no council or senat
e whatever, and which would
nowhere be so dangerous as in the hand
s of a man who had folly and
presumption enough to fancy himself fit to
exercise it
•

.

.

(WN IV.ii.lO; emphasis added)

Philosophy is like any other employment, there is nothing special about
it (WN I.i.9). Philosophers are like any other men, just vainer (WN l.ii.4),
and wise men often simply 'fancied themselves such' (WN V.i.f.25). They
believe things that tum out to be false ('History of Astronomy'). They
think they can generate political and moral order, but 'notwithstanding
. . . the very respectable authority of Plato, Aristotle and Polybius' we are
left with violence, sanguinary factions, and immorality (WN V.i.f.40).
Also educators are cormpted and incompetent
If they [students] are not always
properly educated, it is seldom from
the want of expence laid out upon
their education; but from the
improper application of that expence.
It is seldom from the want of
masters; but from the negligenc
e and incapacity of the masters who
are to be had, and from the difficulty, rathe
r the impossibility which
there is, in the present state of thing
s, of finding any better.
(WN V.i.f.52)
Any 'man of system' who tries to
make decisions for others, disregard
ing
(the imperfections ot) human natur
e, is bound to fail.
A centralized decision-making
system based on some superiori
ty of
certain individuals is 'folly'. Mist
akes are unavoidable. The choi
ce is
between a system that minimizes
their comequences and a syst em
that
globalizes them instead. Centraliz
ed systems are, had been, and will
be
present in human history. But they
are not sustainable in the long
run. Their
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antidote is the multiplications of decision centres that disperse and mini
mize the consequences of errors. Decentralized systems are orderly systemS
that, even if imperfect, allow human society to exist, with all its defects,
and without attempting unnatural improvements that result in disaster.
Smith descrie
b s a stable social order generating from a decentralized
system also at the group level. He allows for 'deviant' group behaviour.
Men are neither perfect nor perfectible, and they perceive differently. What
is thought as right or wrong may vary in time and place, or even within the
same time and place. It is possible that the sympathetic principle with which
harmonic and 'good' moral systems are explained generates approbation
and emulation for anti-social group behaviours. There are brutal political
factions, bloody religious factions, and even societies of thieves. Their
existence is not a problem for Smith. Deviant and anti-social behaviours at
both the individual and group levels are not in contradiction to the social
order generated by a decentralized system. The threat to society is not one
form of deviant behaviour or another, but is the attempt to either eliminate
it or to centralize such deviant and anti-social behaviour. 'That zeal must
be altogether innocent where the society is divided into two or three hun
dreds, or perhaps into as many thousand small sects, of which no one could
be considerable enough to disturb the public tranquillity' (WN V.i.g.8).
Once again, Smith describes a stable social order which is able to minimize
the effect of 'mistakes'. Given the imperfection of human nature, factions
and deviant groups are inevitable. How to minimize the possible social
damages of anti-social behaviour? Localize the area of effect as much as
possible. The more decentralized the system is, the less danger it faces.

Adam Smith's theoretical
endorsement of deception
Eric Schliesser

I Introduction
James Otteson's Adam Smith's Marketplace
ofLife offers a lucid, original,
and insightful reconstruction of a fourfo
ld template that underlies and
unifies Smith's approach to all kinds of
social phenomena (pp. 285-9).
After resurrecting 'The Adam Smith Probl
em' (ASP), Otteson employs
this account to bury it for good. Ottes
on is refreshingly honest that he is
offering a reconstruction of Smith's 'gene
ral model of a market' (p. 102),
even if there is no 'explicit textual evidence'
that Smith intended it as the
'key' to understanding 'the developme
nt and maintenance of all large
scale human institutions' (p. 258). For the
sake of argument, I accept the
reconstruction (for misgivings see Schliesser
2003a). Like a true Smithian
philosopher, Otteson explains the invisi
ble structure that combines the
'most distant and similar' elements of Smith
's written universe (cf. Wealth
of Nations l.i.9).7 Yet, I argue that Smith's views
on theorizing shows
that ASP is generated by too-partial
an understanding of the moral
psychology of WN and that the position
that Otteson attributes to Smith,
as a 'transcendent' endorsement of the
marketplace of life (pp. 252-7), is
itself, according to Smith, a (beneficial
) 'deception'! Smith's commitment
to philosophy falls outside Otteson's
framework.

ill Conclusion
Otteson's account of Smith is accurate. And Smith's account of the devel
opment of social order is accurate as well. Given the assumption, or the
empirical observation, that human nature is imperfect and implies a large
variety of mistakes, and given the choice between a centralized and a decen
tralized system, a decentralized system is preferred both in theory and in
practice, because it is better able to cope with the non-ideal conditions that
characterize human conditions. Decentralized systems unintentionally gen
erate imperfect, yet stable orders both in economic and moral spheres.
Centralized attempts to develop market and moral orders would less likely
generate good orders because they are less likely to survive our inevitable
mistakes.

ll Wonder and admiration in Wealth

ofNations

The crucial premise in Otteson's argument for reviving ASP is that in
WN, Smith appeals 'only' to 'self-interest'; in WN there is no evidence that
Smith thought that 'any motivation besides self-interest is active in h uman
behavior' (p. 156). This is in stark contrast to the complex moral psychol
ogy presented in The Theory ofMoral Sentiments. This is not a problem in
consistency between the two books , for nowhere is it suggested that the
focus on self-love, which for Smith is 'the governing principle in the inter
course of hwnan society' (p. 154, n. 30), would rule out other sources of
motivation; none of the passages, which Otteson cites from WN (p. 155),
go quite that far. Yet, as a reading ofWN, Otteson's position is incomplete.
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